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The arrival of a new form of Coronavirus at the 
end of 2019 and its subsequent expansion to 
multiple countries has already caused severe 
consequences whose final extent we are unfor-
tunately still far from seeing. In our geographical 
context, Italy has been particularly affected by 
this threat. In such circumstances, it is worth ask-
ing what the EU could do to help any of its Mem-
ber States (MS) to cope with such a situation. 
This paper will try to answer it. To this end, we 
will focus on the most important legal instru-
ment: the so-called, “Solidarity Clause” and the 
most relevant political tool, the Integrated Polit-




1 J. BROKENSHIRE, House of Lords European Union Com-
mittee Declaration, Civil Protection and Crisis Man-
agement in the European Union, 6th Report of Session 
2008–09, Ordered to be printed 3 March 2009 and 
2. The solidarity clause 
The Solidarity Clause was created by article 222 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). It includes three main obligations 
to all EU Member States and to the EU Institu-
tions:  
1) The obligation on Member States to «act 
jointly in a spirit of solidarity», which necessarily 
leads to the promotion of cooperation between 
them and the European institutions (Fuchs-
Drapier, 2011). 
2) The obligation of the EU to distribute all the 
means at its disposal, without excluding those 
military means that have been provided by the 
States. Consequently, the EU must make its facil-
ities, infrastructure and any means offered by 
third Member States available in the fight to 
eradicate any crisis. 
3) An obligation on Member States to proactively 
provide assistance to each other when they have 
suffered a serious natural adverse event or when 
the adverse event has been caused, voluntarily 
or involuntarily, by human activity alone. 
In the light of the above, the clause is, ab initio, 
an excellent tool for achieving a coordinated 
functioning of the EU institutions and its Mem-
ber States in the event of CBRNE crises, such as 
the one we are currently experiencing. It is now 
enough for a state affected by a crisis such as 
CoViD-19 to activate the clause so that the EU 
and other states have a legal obligation to inter-
vene1. However, its practical application includes 
some limitations, which we should highlight. 
 
published 11 March 2009. Available at: 
https://bit.ly/2yuQ4K7, point 7, 230 (Last accessed: 
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2.1 The term “solidarity” as a common back-
ground 
“Solidarity” is a word that allows multiple differ-
ent meanings. The concrete notion of solidarity 
included in article 222 is based on a strong belief: 
MS are supposed to make their best efforts to be 
prepared for any crisis and it is only in those 
cases when they feel overwhelmed by the di-
mension of the catastrophe that they could ask 
for everyone else’s help. In our opinion, under 
the circumstances posed by the Coronavirus cri-
sis, it is hard to accuse any of the MS to have bro-
ken the compromise of preparedness surround-
ing the solidarity clause. Indeed, none of them 
seems ready to face a situation that might chal-
lenge all health care systems in the EU arena. 
2.2 The scope of the clause 
An extremely important issue regarding Article 
222 refers to its concrete scope, mainly, the type 
of crisis that might trigger the legal obligations 
involved in the clause and its territorial applica-
tion. Regarding the geographical scope, article 2 
of the Council Decision mentions that the Clause 
applies (a) within the territory of Member States 
to which the Treaties apply, meaning land area, 
internal waters, territorial sea and airspace, and 
(b) when affecting infrastructure (such as off-
shore oil and gas installations) situated in the ter-
ritorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the 
continental shelf of a Member State. However, it 
would be absurd to limit the action of the EU in 
cases when the threat to our population is 
placed outside our borders (think about Cherno-
byl). Thus, a creative interpretation of the liter-
acy of the Clause can be extremely convenient if 
circumstances recom-mend it. 
 
2 M. RHINARD, N. YLANDER, The migration crisis and the 
question of solidarity, Transcrisis LSE, 2015. 
The same type of issue arises when we concen-
trate on the types of crises that Article 222 is fo-
cusing on. At a first glance, the text of the Clause 
seems quite clear. It was designed to help Mem-
ber States to provide an adequate answer to nat-
ural or man-made disasters. Thus, a wide inter-
pretation of expressions such as “terrorist 
threat” seems recommendable. The same could 
be said about “natural or man-made disasters”. 
In our opinion, the migration crisis, for instance, 
could fit in perfectly with the scope of the Clause, 
since the Decision defines these types of situa-
tions as «any situation which has or may have a 
severe impact on people, the environment or 
property, including cultural heritage». There-
fore, the Solidarity Clause could be invoked un-
der the current circumstances2. 
2.3 The obligations. The assistance to be pro-
vided 
What is the level of commitment that the invo-
cation of the Clause must provoke? The answer 
to this question is quite disappointing. First, it is 
crystal clear now that the Clause does not oblige 
the EU institutions to create new tools or mobi-
lise new resources, no matter that Article 222.1 
states that «the Union shall mobilise all the in-
struments at its disposal». As the Council Deci-
sion of 24 June 2014 on the arrangements for the 
implementation by the Union of the solidarity 
clause states, «The implementation of the soli-
darity clause by the Union should rely on existing 
instruments to the extent possible, should in-
crease effectiveness by enhancing coordination 
and avoiding duplication, should function on the 
basis of no additional resources, should provide 
a simple and clear interface at Union level to 
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competences conferred upon each Union institu-
tion and service» (recital 4). 
Therefore, an invocation of the Clause would 
mobilize several EU instruments, such as the Eu-
ropean Union Internal Security Strategy, the Eu-
ropean Union Civil Protection Mechanism estab-
lished by Decision No 1313/2013/EU of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council (the Union 
Mechanism), Decision No 1082/2013/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and the 
structures developed in the framework of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but 
not necessarily any others.  
Regarding the commitments of the Member 
States, the situation is also quite disappointing, 
since it is the non-affected Member State who 
decides on the resources to be provided, accord-
ing to the Declaration (No 37) of Article 222 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Therefore, it will always be the non-af-
fected State who decides on the level of the re-
sources involved, usually organized in “mod-
ules”. Moreover, the non-affected State will 
keep control over the modules deployed, even if 
local authorities are responsible for the response 
to the crisis. And what if a Member State directly 
refuses to send any kind of help with no further 
justification? Could it be sanctioned? That is 
quite difficult to say. Fuchs-Drapier wrote that 
«in practice, the ECJ has rather limited scope to 
scrutinize a Member State’s compliance with the 
Solidarity Clause for legal reason, as well as lack 
of political will»3 Indeed, since the European 
Court of Justice has no jurisdiction with respect 
 
3 M. FUCHS-DRAPIER, The European Union’s Solidarity 
Clause in the Event of a Terrorist Attack: Towards Sol-
idarity or Maintaining Sovereignty? in Journal of Con-
tingencies and Crisis Management, 19, 4, 4 December 
2011, 184-197 (184). 
4 P. HILPOLD, Understanding Solidarity within EU Law: 
An Analysis of the 'Islands of Solidarity' with Particular 
to defence implications, the police and military 
operations carried out under the application of 
the Solidarity Clause would never be controlled 
by this institution. Keeping this in mind, one has 
to conclude that a country unwilling to comply 
with the obligations coming from an invocation 
of the Clause would feel pressured more by po-
litical reasons than by purely legal concerns, 
since sanctions would be hardly applicable. 
3. The implementation of the Clause: the IPCRs 
3.1. Introduction 
There are two ways to appeal to the Solidarity 
Clause. First, A Member State can ask another 
Member State for help. In this case, Article 222 
states that both countries «shall coordinate be-
tween themselves in the European Council»4. 
However, this does not seem to be a binding con-
dition for Member States. The second way im-
plies a more prescribed involvement of the EU. 
In this case, there is a quite complex formal pro-
cedure designed to guarantee a successful acti-
vation of the Clause. First, the affected Member 
State must notify its intentions to both the Mem-
ber State holding the rotating Presidency (who 
will immediately inform the President of the Eu-
ropean Council and the President of the Euro-
pean Parliament) and to the President of the 
Commission through the Emergency Response 
and Coordination Centre (ERCC)5. After receiving 
this requirement, the EU Integrated Political Cri-
sis Response arrangements (IPCR Arrangements, 
approved by the General Affairs Council (GAC) 25 
Regard to Monetary Union, in Yearbook of European 
Law, 34, 1, 2015, 257-285. 
5 G. BONACQUISTI, The solidarity clause: one of the most 
unacknowledged innovations of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The European Parliament debates its implementation 
but also its ambiguities, in Blogactiv, 2015. Available 
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June 2013, updating the CCA) are automatically 
activated. 
At the same time, the Commission and the High 
Representative have to mobilize a number of EU 
institutions (such as DG ECHO, HOME, SANCO, 
TAXUD, among others) or EU decentralized agen-
cies (FRONTEX, ECDC, EUROPOL, EMSA, EFSA, 
EMA etc.) depending on the type and dimension 
of the threat. The most important of all of these 
is the Commission’s Emergency Response Coor-
dination Centre (ERCC), which has a 24/7 moni-
toring capacity that allows instant reactions to 
emergencies. This body has its own personnel 
and a sufficient budget to play its essential role, 
to coordinate the operational response and pro-
duce joint situation assessment reports if no 
other EU institution is proven to be more ade-
quate to play that role6. 
3.2. Main characters of the IPCRs 
The scope of the IPCRs is very wide. They refer to 
crisis and crisis situations such as: «major emer-
gencies or crises, whether inside or outside the 
EU, of such a wide-ranging impact or political sig-
nificance, that they require timely policy coordi-
nation and response at EU political level. This 
could result from a number of affected or in-
volved Member States, or the cross-sectoral na-
ture of the crises, the imminence thereof, or 
from time constraints, or combination of these 
factors» (pursuant to the Paragraph 1 of the An-
nex, Council of the European Union Document 
10708/13, references to “crisis” or ‘crisis situa-
tions’ throughout this document cover crises as 
indicated in this paragraph). 
From an organisational point of view, the IPCRs 
make it possible to coordinate the action of ac-
tors such as the Member States, the General 
 
6 A. NIMARK, P. PAWLAK, Upgrading the Union’s Re-
sponse To Disaster, Brief Issue, in European Union In-
stitute for Security Studies, 45, 2013. Available at: 
Secretariat of the Council, the Commission, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), among 
others, since they all participate in the response 
process, regardless of the activation formula 
launched by the IPCRs. 
From the perspective of new technological capa-
bilities, it is worth mentioning the Integrated Sit-
uational Awareness and Analysis (ISAA), a tool 
designed by the Commission and the SEAE on the 
basis of the existing resources that supports de-
cision making by the Presidency and the Council. 
It is also important to highlight that the IPCR in-
cludes the development of a new virtual plat-
form, ruled by the Council, which is permanently 
available, even though access is restricted to au-
thorized participants. It gathers information pro-
vided by the Member States, the Commission, 
the EEAS, and various EU agencies. The IPCR 
states that in times of crisis, one or more crisis 
pages can be generated, depending on the situ-
ation and policy needs. Its main task is to provide 
all participants with an overview of the situation, 
as well as its possible evolution and conse-
quences after the activation of IPCR. 
Conceptually, the IPCRs are based on a process 
of progressivity, which gives them significant 
flexibility in their operation. Depending on the 
characteristics and intensity of each crisis, it will 
be possible to determine which levels of the rel-
evant institutions will be involved. This means 
that the final responsibility for major crisis man-
agement could be assumed by the Council (i.e. 
The Council of Ministers of the EU) or even by the 
European Council, if the gravity of the situation 
indicates that it would be advisable to proceed in 
this way. 
Finally, we would like to point out that the IPCR's 
founding charter includes as one of its 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/upgrading-un-
ion%E2%80%99s-response-disasters (Last accessed: 
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fundamental objectives the support for the soli-
darity clause, ensuring a coherent, efficient and 
timely response at EU policy level in the event of 
activation (one set of agreements to deal with 
crises). Indeed, the link between the IPCR and 
the solidarity clause has been strengthened after 
the Council adopted a decision on the 24th June 
2014 concerning the arrangements for the im-
plementation by the Union of the solidarity 
clause (2014/415/EU). The IPCR is explicitly men-
tioned in Articles 1 and 5. Article 1 states that the 
IPCR agreements will serve as the appropriate 
tool to be used by the Council to coordinate at 
the political level the response to the invocation 
of the solidarity clause. Article 5 states that the 
IPCR is the means by which the Council Presi-
dency will ensure the political and strategic di-
rection of the Union's response to the invocation 
of the solidarity clause, taking full account of the 
Commission's human resources responsibilities. 
It must therefore be concluded that, in line with 
the new legal framework, the IPCR has a key role 
to play in the implementation of the solidarity 
clause7. 
(20 May 2020) 
7 For  further readings see: E. ATIENZA MACÍAS, 
Incidencia de una crisis sanitaria global en el Derecho 
Deportivo. De la cancelación de unos Juegos 
Olímpicos al auge de los e-Sports, Las respuestas del 
Derecho a las crisis de Salud Pública, E. ATIENZA MACÍAS, 
E., J. F RODRÍGUEZ AYUSO, (Dirs.), Madrid, 2020, 309-329. 
I. DE MIGUEL BERIAIN, Triaje en tiempos de pandemia: 
un análisis a partir de las limitaciones del marco 
jurídico español, Las respuestas del Derecho a las 
crisis de Salud Pública, E. ATIENZA MACÍAS, J.F RODRÍGUEZ 
AYUSO, (Dirs.), Madrid, 2020, . 229-241; I. DE MIGUEL 
BERIAIN, E. ATIENZA MACÍAS, E. ARMAZA ARMAZA, The 
European Union Integrated Political Crisis Response 
Arrangements: Improving the European Union’s 
Major Crisis Response Coordination Capacities, in 
Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, 3, 
9, Cambridge, June 2015, 234-238. 
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